Thứ Ba, 26 tháng 4, 2011

Quality of Life: India vs. China

Quality of Life: India vs. China

MAY 12, 2011,Amartya Sen
Dinodia/Stock Connection/Aurora Photos
Girls in a classroom in the Indian model village of Ralegan Siddhi, northeast of Pune, Maharashtra, 2006
My primary concern is that the illusions generated by those distorted perceptions of prosperity may prevent India from bringing social deprivations into political focus, which is essential for achieving what needs to be done for Indians at large through its democratic system. A fuller understanding of the real conditions of the mass of neglected Indians and what can be done to improve their lives through public policy should be a central issue in the politics of India.
This is exactly where the exclusive concentration on the rate of GNP growth has the most damaging effect. Economic growth can make a very large contribution to improving people’s lives; but single-minded emphasis on growth has limitations that need to be clearly understood.
1.
The steadily rising rate of economic growth in India has recently been around 8 percent per year (it is expected to be 9 percent this year), and there is much speculation about whether and when India may catch up with and surpass China’s over 10 percent growth rate. Despite the evident excitement that this
subject seems to cause in India and abroad, it is surely rather silly to be obsessed about India’s overtaking China in the rate of growth of GNP, while not comparing India with China in other respects, like education, basic health, or life expectancy. Economic growth can, of course, be enormously helpful in
advancing living standards and in battling poverty. But there is little cause for taking the growth of GNP to be an end in itself, rather than seeing it as an important means for achieving things we value.
It could, however, be asked why this distinction should make much difference, since economic growth does enhance our ability to improve living standards. The central point to appreciate here is that while economic growth is important for enhancing living conditions, its reach and impact depend greatly on what we do with the increased income. The relation between economic growth and the advancement of living standards depends
on many factors, including economic and social inequality and, no less importantly, on what the government does with the public revenue that is generated by economic growth.
Some statistics about China and India, drawn mainly from the World Bank and the United Nations, are relevant here. Life expectancy at birth in China is 73.5 years; in India it is 64.4 years. The infant mortality rate is fifty per thousand in India, compared with just seventeen in China; the mortality rate for children under five is sixty-six per thousand for Indians and nineteen for the Chinese; and the maternal mortality rate is 230 per 100,000 live births in India and thirty-eight in China. The mean years of schooling in India were
estimated to be 4.4 years, compared with 7.5 years in China. China’s adult
literacy rate is 94 percent, compared with India’s 74 percent according to the
preliminary tables of the 2011 census.
As a result of India’s effort to improve the schooling of girls, its literacy rate
for women between the ages of fifteen and twenty-four has clearly risen; but
that rate is still not much above 80 percent, whereas in China it is 99 percent.
One of the serious failures of India is that a very substantial proportion of
Indian children are, to varying degrees, undernourished (depending on the
criteria used, the proportion can come close to half of all children), compared
with a very small proportion in China. Only 66 percent of Indian children are
immunized with triple vaccine (diphtheria/pertussis/tetanus), as opposed to
97 percent in China.
Comparing India with China according to such standards can be more useful
for policy discussions in India than confining the comparison to GNP growth
rates only. Those who are fearful that India’s growth performance would
suffer if it paid more attention to “social objectives”such as education and
health care should seriously consider that notwithstanding these “social”
activities and achievements, China’s rate of GNP growth is still clearly
higher than India’s.
2.
Higher GNP has certainly helped China to reduce various indicators of
poverty and deprivation, and to expand different features of the quality of life. There is every reason to want to encourage sustainable economic growth
in India in order to improve living standards today and in the future
(including taking care of the environment in which we live). Sustainable
economic growth is a very good thing in a way that “growth mania”is not.
GNP per capita is, however, not invariably a good predictor of valuable
features of our lives, for those features depend also on other things that we
do— or fail to do. Compare India with Bangladesh. In income, India has a
huge lead over Bangladesh, with a GNP per capita of $1,170, compared with
$590 in Bangladesh, in comparable units of purchasing power. This
difference has expanded rapidly because of India’s faster rate of recent
economic growth, and that, of course, is a point in India’s favor. India’s
substantially higher rank than Bangladesh in the UN Human Development
Index (HDI) is largely due to this particular achievement. But we must ask
how well India’s income advantage is reflected in other things that also
matter. I fear the answer is: not well at all.
Life expectancy in Bangladesh is 66.9 years compared with India’s 64.4. The
proportion of underweight children in Bangladesh (41.3 percent) is lower
than in India (43.5), and its fertility rate (2.3) is also lower than India’s (2.7).
Mean years of schooling amount to 4.8 years in Bangladesh compared with
India’s 4.4 years. While India is ahead of Bangladesh in the male literacy
rate for the age group between fifteen and twenty-four, the female rate in
Bangladesh is higher than in India. Interestingly, the female literacy rate
among young Bangladeshis is actually higher than the male rate, whereas
young women still have substantially lower rates than young males in India.
There is much evidence to suggest that Bangladesh’s current progress has a
great deal to do with the role that liberated Bangladeshi women are beginning to play in the country.
What about health? The mortality rate of children under five is sixty-six per
thousand in India compared with fifty-two in Bangladesh. In infant mortality, Bangladesh has a similar advantage: it is fifty per thousand in India and forty-one in Bangladesh. While 94 percent of Bangladeshi children are immunized with DPT vaccine, only 66 percent of Indian children are. In each of these respects, Bangladesh does better than India, despite having only half of India’s per capita income.
Of course, Bangladesh’s living conditions will benefit greatly from higher
economic growth, particularly if the country uses it as a means of doing good
things, rather than treating economic growth and high per capita income as
ends in themselves. It is to the huge credit of Bangladesh that despite the
adversity of low income it has been able to do so much so quickly; the
imaginative activism of Bangladeshi NGOs (such as the Grameen Bank, the
pioneering microcredit institution, and BRAC, a large-scale initiative aimed
at removing poverty) as well as the committed public policies of the
government have both contributed to the results. But higher income,
including larger public resources, will obviously enhance Bangladesh’s
ability to achieve better lives for its people.
3.
One of the positive things about economic growth is that it generates public
resources that the government can devote to its priorities. In fact, public
resources very often grow faster than the GNP. The gross tax revenue, for
example, of the government of India (corrected for price rise) is now more
than four times what it was just twenty years ago, in 1990–1991. This is a
substantially bigger jump than the price-corrected GNP.
Expenditure on what is somewhat misleadingly called the “social sector”—
health, education, nutrition, etc.— has certainly gone up in India. And yet
India is still well behind China in many of these fields. For example,
government expenditure on health care in China is nearly five times that in
India. China does, of course, have a larger population and a higher per capita
income than India, but even in relative terms, while the Chinese government
spends nearly 2 percent of GDP (1.9 percent) on health care, the proportion
is only a little above one percent (1.1 percent) in India.
One result of the relatively low allocation of funds to public health care in
India is that large numbers of poor people across the country rely on private
doctors, many of whom have little medical training. Since health is also a
typical example of “asymmetric information,”in which the patients may know very little about what the doctors (or “supposed doctors”) are giving
them, even the possibility of fraud and deceit is very large. In a study
conducted by the Pratichi Trust— a public interest trust I set up in 1999— we
found cases in which the ignorance of poor patients about their condition
was exploited so as to make them pay for treatment they didn’t get. This is
the result not only of shameful exploitation, but ultimately of the sheer
unavailability of public health care in many parts of India. The benefit that
we can expect to get from economic growth depends very much on how the
public revenue generated by economic growth is expended.
4.
When we consider the impact of economic growth on people’s lives,
comparisons favor China over India. However, there are many fields in
which a comparison between China and India is not related to economic
growth in any obvious way. Most Indians are strongly appreciative of the
democratic structure of the country, including its many political parties,
systematic free elections, uncensored media, free speech, and the independent standing of the judiciary, among other characteristics of a lively
democracy. Those Indians who are critical of serious flaws in these
arrangements (and I am certainly one of them) can also take account of what
India has already achieved in sustaining democracy, in contrast to many
other countries, including China.
Not only is access to the Internet and world opinion uncensored and
unrestricted in India, a multitude of media present widely different points of
view, often very critical of the government in office. India has a larger
circulation of newspapers each day than any other country in the world. And
the newspapers reflect contrasting political perspectives. Economic growth
has helped— and this has certainly been a substantial gain— to expand the
availability of radios and televisions across the country, including in rural
areas, which very often are shared among many users. There are at least 360
independent television stations (and many are being established right now,
judging from the licenses already issued) and their broadcasts reflect a
remarkable variety of points of view. More than two hundred of these TV
stations concentrate substantially or mainly on news, many of them around
the clock. There is a sharp contrast here with the monolithic system of
newscasting permitted by the state in China, with little variation of political
perspectives on different channels.
Freedom of expression has its own value as a potentially important
instrument for democratic politics, but also as something that people enjoy
and treasure. Even the poorest parts of the population want to participate in
social and political life, and in India they can do so. There is a contrast as
well in the use of trial and punishment, including capital punishment. China
often executes more people in a week than India has executed since
independence in 1947. If our focus is on a comprehensive comparison of the
quality of life in India and China, we have to look well beyond the
traditional social indicators, and many of these comparisons are not to
China’s advantage.
Could it be that India’s democratic system is somehow a barrier to using the
benefits of economic growth in order to enhance health, education, and other
social conditions? Clearly not, as I shall presently discuss. It is worth recalling that when India had a very low rate of economic growth, as was the case until the 1980s, a common argument was that democracy was hostile to fast economic growth. It was hard to convince those opposed to democracy that fast economic growth depends on an economic climate congenial to development rather than on fierce political control, and that a political system that protects democratic rights need not impede economic growth.
That debate has now ended, not least because of the high economic growth
rates of democratic India. We can now ask: How should we assess the
alleged conflict between democracy and the use of the fruits of economic
growth for social advancement?
5.
What a democratic system achieves depends greatly on which social
conditions become political issues. Some conditions become politically
important issues quickly, such as the calamity of a famine (thus famines tend
not to occur at all when there is a functioning democracy), while other
problems— less spectacular and less immediate— provide a much harder
challenge. It is much more difficult to use democratic politics to remedy
undernourishment that is not extreme, or persistent gender inequality, or the
absence of regular medical care for all. Success or failure here depends on
the range and vigor of democratic practice. 1 In recent years Indian
democracy has made considerable progress in dealing with some of these
conditions, such as gender inequality, lack of schools, and widespread
undernourishment. Public protests, court decisions, and the use of the
recently passed “Right to Information”. Act have had telling effects. But
India still has a long way to go in remedying these conditions.
In China, by contrast, the process of decision-making depends largely on
decisions made by the top Party leaders, with relatively little democratic
pressure from below. The Chinese leaders, despite their skepticism about the
values of multiparty democracy and personal and political liberty, are
strongly committed to eliminating poverty, undernourishment, illiteracy, and
lack of health care; and this has greatly helped in China’s advancement.
There is, however, a serious fragility in any authoritarian system of
governance, since there is little recourse or remedy when the government
leaders alter their goals or suppress their failures.
The reality of that danger revealed itself in a catastrophic form in the
Chinese famine of 1959–1962, which killed more than 30 million people,
when there was no public pressure against the regime’s policies, as would
have arisen in a functioning democracy. Mistakes in policy continued for
three years while tens of millions died. To take another example, the
economic reforms of 1979 greatly improved the working and efficiency of
Chinese agriculture and industry; but the Chinese government also
eliminated, at the same time, the entitlement of all to public medical care
(which was often administered through the communes). Most people were
then required to buy their own health insurance, drastically reducing the
proportion of the population with guaranteed health care.
In a functioning democracy an established right to social assistance could not
have been so easily— and so swiftly— dropped. The change sharply reduced
the progress of longevity in China. Its large lead over India in life
expectancy dwindled during the following two decades— falling from a
fourteen-year lead to one of just seven years.
The Chinese authorities, however, eventually realized what had been lost,
and from 2004 they rapidly started reintroducing the right to medical care.
China now has a considerably higher proportion of people with guaranteed
health care than does India. The gap in life expectancy in China’s favor has
been rising again, and it is now around nine years; and the degree of
coverage is clearly central to the difference. 2 Whether India’s democratic
political system can effectively remedy neglected public services such as
health care is one of the most urgent questions facing the country. 3
6.
For a minority of the Indian population— but still very large in actual
numbers— economic growth alone has been very advantageous, since they
are already comparatively privileged and need no social assistance to benefit
from economic growth. The limited prosperity of recent years has helped to
support a remarkable variety of lifestyles as well as globally acclaimed
developments of Indian literature, music, cinema, theater, painting, and the
culinary arts, among other cultural activities.
Yet an exaggerated concentration on the lives of the relatively prosperous,
exacerbated by the Indian media, gives an unrealistically rosy picture of the
lives of Indians in general. Since the fortunate group includes not only
business leaders and the professional classes but also many of the country’s
intellectuals, the story of unusual national advancement is widely and
persistently heard. More worryingly, relatively privileged Indians can easily
fall for the temptation to focus just on economic growth as a grand social
benefactor for all.
Some critics of the huge social inequalities in India find something callous
and uncouth in the self-centered lives and inward-looking preoccupations of
a relatively prosperous minority. My primary concern, however, is that the
illusions generated by those distorted perceptions of prosperity may prevent
India from bringing social deprivations into political focus, which is
essential for achieving what needs to be done for Indians at large through its
democratic system. A fuller understanding of the real conditions of the mass
of neglected Indians and what can be done to improve their lives through
public policy should be a central issue in the politics of India.
This is exactly where the exclusive concentration on the rate of GNP growth
has the most damaging effect. Economic growth can make a very large
contribution to improving people’s lives; but single-minded emphasis on
growth has limitations that need to be clearly understood.

1. 1 I have discussed this issue more fully in " How Is India Doing? ," The New York Review , December 16, 1982; in (jointly with Jean Drèze) Hunger and Public Action (Clarendon Press/Oxford University Press, 1989); and in
Development as Freedom (Knopf, 1999). ↩
2. 2 I discuss this in "The Art of Medicine: Learning from Others," The Lancet , January 15, 2011. ↩
3. 3 I am grateful to Lincoln Chen, Jean Drèze, and A.K. Shiva Kumar for
helpful discussion of this and related issues. ↩
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